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Accounting for the Stative Adverb Gap 
Graham Katz 
University of Tilbingen 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I will give an account of the distributional fact that there are no stative 
adverbs. We find any number of adverbs that combine with event verbs to the exclusion 
of state verbs, but we do not find the converse, adverbs that combine with state verbs to 
the exclusion of event verbs. 1 In other words, while contrasts such as that in (1) are 
common, a contrast such as that given schematically in (2) is unattested. 
(1) a. Peter kissed Sue gently/perfunctorily/slowly/an the front porch. 
b. ??Peter loved Su.e gently/perfunctorily/slowly/an the front porch. 
(2) a. ??P,',r kissed Su, ADVERB. 
b. Peter loved Sue ADVERB. 
There are, of course. many adverbials that combine with both state verbs and event 
verbs: Temporal adverbials such as last year. modal adverbs such as probably. and 
speech act adverbs such as frankly aU do. What we don't fmd are adverbs that modify 
exclusively state verbs. Let us call this lacuna in the space of possible adverbs the Stative 
Adverb Gap (SAG). Accounting for this gap is the subject of this paper. I suggest, 
furthennore, that any theory of adverbs worth its salt should account for it 
Such an account must answer two questions. The first question concerns the 
nature of verb-adverb selection in general: What is it? Why do certain adverbs appear to 
select for certain verbs to begin with? The second is the more specific question, why 
donlt we find classes of adverbs that select only for state verbs. Modem neo-Davidsonian 
theories of adverbial modification such as those defended at length by Parsons (1990), 
I There arc two exceptions. pointed out to me by a NELS reviewer, JlilI and no iangt!r. which will 
be discussed toward the end of the paper. 
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Kamp and ReyJe (1993) Wyner (1994) and others provide a framework within which the 
first question can be quite satisfactorily answered. Unfortunately they fail miserably 
when it comes to the second. In fact, I will argue, if the neo·Davidsonian account of 
sentence semantics were correct we would expect stative adverbs to be plentiful. 
2. Neo-Davidsonian Theory 
N~Davidsonian approaches to sentence semantics have grown in popularity since the 
early work of Bach (1981) and Parsons (1985). Pretty much everybody adopts the neo-
Davidsonian view these days, it seems. To review briefly, the fundamental neo-
Davidsonian assumptions is the following: 
• Verbs denote predicates of eventualities (states or events) 
The beauty of this fundamental assumption about verbal meanings is, among other things, 
the simple analysis of adverbial modification it makes available, namely the following: 
• Adverbs1 denote predicates of eventualities 
• Adverbial modification is (essentially) simple conjunction 
An example derivation illustrates the main features of the approach. 
(3) a. John leave 
b. slowly 
).. D.aving(.) & Ag.nt(.) = John]] 
A P A. [P(.) & ,Iow(.)] 
c. John left slowly 3 e [leaving(e) & Agent(e) = John & slow(e) & e < now] 
The untensed clause is (like the verb) a predicate of events. Adverbs, while of a higher 
type, introduce into the LFs underlying first order predication over events as well . Tense 
infonnation locates the eventuality with respect to the speech time (also conjunctively), 
and existential closure applies to give a propositional meaning. 
An appealing innovation of the neo-Davidsonian approach, one that is central to our 
concerns here, is the treatment of VendlerlDowty-type aspecrual classes (Vendler 1967; 
Dowty 1979). Since all verbs are interpreted simply as predicates of eventualities, the 
distinctions among the aspectual classes can be characterized in tenns of properties of 
these eventuality predicates. The most straightfOlward characterization is the following 
(taken from Bach (1986» : 
• State verbs are those verbs that denote predicates of states. 
• Activity verbs are those verbs that denote predicates of homogeneous events. 
• Accomplishment verbs are those verbs that denote predicates of non-
homogeneous events. 
1 VP.adverbs of the slowly type. not S-adverbs of the probably type 
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• Accomplishment verbs are those verbs that denote predicates of momentary 
events. 
365 
The characterization of the classes has become ever more sophisticated (Higginbotham 
1996), but the basic intuition has remained the same: it is the character of the eventuality 
predication that distinguishes the aspectuaJ classes, from one another. It is this latter 
innovation, at least as it applies to state verbs, that we will take to task in the sequel. Let 
us now tum to adverb selection. 
3. Verb-Adverb Selection 
It is well known that adverbs semantically select the verbs they can appear with 
(Jackendoff 1972; Rochette 1990). That is to say, certain adverbs appear with some types 
of verbs but not with other types of veros. This is illustrated by the pairs in (4)-{6). 
(4) a. Austin tripped accidentally. 
b . 11 Austin wrote his book accidentally. 
(5) a. Melanie talked endlessly. 
b . ??Melanie finished her book endlessly. 
(6) a . Steve finished his book quickJy. 
b. ??Steve slept quickly . 
Before we can give an adquate account of the SAG, we certainly need to understand the 
mechanisms underlying this kind of verb-adverb selection. 
3.1 A Neo-Davidsonian Account of Verb-Adverb Selection 
The neo-Davidsonian approach makes available a very appealing perspective on verb-
adverb selection of this type. Verb-adverb incompatibility is simply the result of an 
attempt to apply two incompatible predicates to the same object. In this way it is 
essentially the same phenomenon as classical " selectional restrictions" (Chomsky 1965; 
Katz and Fodor 1964) of the type illustrated in (7): 
(7) a. ??My shirt wants to go home. 
b . ??My thoughts were very taU . 
In much the way that there is an incompatibility between wanting something and being a 
shirt, and between being tall and being a thought, there is an incompatibility between 
being a book-writing and being accidental. 
Intuitively this seems right: The infelicity of (4b) does seem somehow seem to be 
tied to the fact that for an event to be classified as accidental it must be done without 
intent, whereas any event of book-writing is, necessarily, intentional. The neo-
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Davidsonian approach. of course, gives us a way of making this intuition precise since. 
formally speaking, the classical subject-predicate case and the verb-adverb case are 
exactly parallel. In the subject-predicate case (7b) the individual predicate thought i.s 
incompatible with the individual predicate tall, whereas in the verb-adverb case the event 
predicate 'Write a bock is incompatible with the event predicate accidental.) 
The infelicity associated with selectional-restriction violations can easily be derived from 
Grice's (Grice 1975) Maxim oflnformativeness. We can say that a predicate Q violates 
the selectional restrictions of a predicate P iff it is not possible that some entity" satisfy 
both P and Q. When it is not possible for an entity to satisfy both predicates, a sentence is 
uninformative, thus infelicitious. It is clear, then, why sentences such as (8) give rise to 
selectional-restriction violations. 
(8) The bachelor's wife was Charming. 
The predicate bacbelor, meaning unmarried man, is not compatible with having a wife 
Furthermore, such examples point to another feature of selectional restriction violations: 
When selectional restrictions are violated, speakers attempt to reinterpret one or both of 
the predicates which are incompatible so as to "save" the utterance. So in (8) a hearer 
might interpret the word bachelor as making reference to a man who, while married, has 
many other features of bachelorhood. Likewise, we attempt to understand sentences such 
as (4b) by reinterpreting acciden/al/y as being something at least possibly compatible 
with book-writing, for example we might take it to mean something like effortlessly and 
quickly. 
3.2 Back to the SAG 
The neo-Davidsonian can, then, easily tell us why there are adverbs that don't appear with 
state verbs . The account is simply this: Adverbs that select for dynamic or agentive 
properties of an eventuality, as slowly and intentionaly clearly do, will not combine with 
predicates of states, which are static, non-agentive. The sentence (9a) has a perfectly 
good logical analysis, as indicated by (9b). 
(9) a. ??Peter loved Mal}' gently. 
b.3 e ~oving(e) & Subj(e) ~ John & Theme(e) - MlU)' & gently(e) & e < now] 
The reason (9a) is odd is simply that gently is a manner of action adverb, meaning 
roughJy the manner in which the event was acted out was gentle. On its stative reading 
love is a predicate of states. States, being static do not have manners of being acted out, 
and so it is not possible for gently to apply to such an eventuality. 
) We arc being a bit loose about what exactly the event predicate is. rn the neo-Davidsonian 
rramcworic: aU verbal projec::rions, up to and including the scQlenec, arc interpreted as event predicates, so 
"Writ. , "Wrilt! Q book and Ailltin writ~ Q book au all P(~idte! or events. more or leu specified as to the 
participan15. 
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This much is sensible and, in a certain sense, I think it is correct. The problem is 
that we are stuck thinking there should be some adverbs out there that are fonnally like 
gently except that they select for non-dynamic, non-8gentive eventualities. Classical 
selectional restrictions are like this. They make up full paradigms. In other words, if P 
and Q are incompatible, there will be a P' and Q' such that P and Q' are compatible, P' and 
Q are compatible, and P' and Q' are incompatible. Consider the subject predicate case in 
(10): 
(10) a . The mountain is tall. 
b. ??My thoughts are tall . 
c. ??The mountain is confused. 
d. My thoughts are confused. 
We don't have only have predicate that select for mental objects to the exclusion of 
others. We also have predicates do that select for otheT objects to the exclusion ofmenta1 
objects. 
Leaving stative verbs out, verbs and adverbs exhibit this quality as as well . We 
find such paradigms as (11). 
(11) a. ??John slept quickJy. 
b. John ran quickly. 
c. John slept slept deeply 
d. ??John ran deeply. 
I would like to suggest that paradigm filling is a characteristic of true selectional 
restrictions. There is certainly good reason to expect it to be: selectional restrictions 
reflect the semantic compatibility of predicates afthe same semantic type, but of different 
syntactic category. Since there is no a priori association of classes of meanings to 
syntactic categories (beyond semantic type). we expect that the classes of compatible 
(and incompatible) predicates should be distributed among the syntactic classes. 
This is exactly what is missing in the case of the stative adverb gap, however, and 
leading me to doubt that it is truly a case of simple semantic selectional at work To put it 
another way, from a neo-Davidsonian perspective the lack of stative adverbs is merely an 
accidental gap. Nothing in the theory rules them out We can even suggest what kind of 
logical fonn they would have: 
(12) state-<Idverb A.P A. e [P(e) & state-adverb(e)] 
They would be modifiers of eventuality predicates, with the additional property that 
happen to select only for eventualities that are non-dynamic and non-agentive. These 
don't appear, however. Our paradigm has a hole in it, and any linguist should wonder 
why. 
5
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An often expressed intuition is that the reason for this is that states simply don't 
have many properties. Events are much more interesting. If events are like paintings, 
states are like blank canvases. Both have dimensions, but for a canvas that is about all 
there is to it, whereas for a painting we can talk about the theme of the painting, the 
Shading. the usc of light and so on. In the case of states and events, while we can talk 
about dimensions (spatitHemporai properties) of both, for events we can also talk about 
the manner, the speed and the intent with which an action is carried out. For states none 
of these things make sense. 
I find this intuition compelling, and take it to show us is that events and states are 
not two classes of the same type of object, as the neo-Davidsonian would have it, but 
rather that events afC highly articulated things of which states are the most simple fonn. 
[n the next section attempt to give this intuition formal expression and use it to account 
for the stative adverb gap. [would like to suggest, that is, that the lack of stative adverbs 
is not an accidental property of the lexicon, but in fact follows from a certain semantic 
analysis of state/non-state distinction. 
, 
4. Oassical Davidsonianism 
Davidson (1967) suggested that in contrast to event verbs, "fact" verbs do not have event 
arguments. This suggestion has been taken up by a number of researchers. who have 
applied it to the state/non-state contrast in general (see Galton (1984). LOhner (1988). 
Sandstr"m (1993), and Katz (1995». On such an account the semantic contrast between 
(13a) and (13b) is represented at the level oflogica1 fonn very roughly as in (14). 
(\3) a. Sandy kissed Kim. 
b. Sandy liked IGm. 
(14) ~ 3 e [kiss(e,Sandy,Kim)] 
b. 1ike(Sandy,Kim) 
A3 we see. transitive state verbs are taken to be of a different logical type than transitive 
event verbs. For ease of reference, let us call any theory with this feature a "classical" 
Davidsonian theolY, contrasting it with neo-Davidsonian theolY. on wruch all verbs, state 
verbs included, have underlying eventuality arguments. Tn other work (Katz 1997; Katz 
1999) I have presented a number of arguments for adopting the classical Davidsonian 
approach in preference to the neo-Davidsonian. Here [wil l limit myself to the discussion 
of adverbial modification. In the sections that follow I outline a velY specific proposal 
along classical Davidsonian lines. 
4.1 The syntax and semantics or the slale/c.vent distinction 
Since both state sentences and event sentences have temporal components to their 
semantics, [ will assume that both saturated state verbs and saturated event verbs are 
predicates of times. Tenses will apply to these to yield propositional meanings. The 
"upper" part of the system, then, is fairly standard: 
6
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• Sentence meanings are propositions 
• Fully saturated verbs are properties of times 
• Tenses are functions from predicates oftimes to propositions 
We will distinguish fully saturated verbs from "nominally" saturated verbs. Nominally 
saturated verbs are those that have all their nominal argument roles filled, but may be 
missing an underlying implicit argument. The basic assumption of the classical 
Davidsonian approach is that eventive verbs can be nominally saturated without being 
fully sahlrated. The basic difference between state verbs and event verbs then is that: 
• Nominally saturated state verbs are properties of times 
• Nominally saturated event verbs are properties of events 
The real difference between state sentences and non4state sentences, then, appears in the 
"lower" reaches, below the VP and the TP. Following KJein (1994) and others I assume 
the existence of two aspectual operators that turn predicates of events (nominally 
saturated event verbs) into predicates of times. These are the operators PERFECTIVE 
and PROGRESSIVE. 
If we make the further natural assumption these operators are syntactic heads, it 
follows that the state/event contrast is expressed in the syntax, as illustrated in (15) : 
(15) a. [rr Sandy, [T PAST ["',' PERFECTIVE [v, I, kiss Kim 11ll 
b.[", SandY'[TPAST[v, 1,likeKimlll 
Note that there is, then, a mismatch between syntactic category and semantic type in the 
lexical vocabulary, since stative VPs and non-stative VPs are of different semantic type. 
Stative VPs and eventive AspPs, however, are both properties of times. 
I assume that these syntactic structures are interpreted fairly directly. Here for 
ease of exposition we translate the syntactic expressions into more familiar logical forms. 
These logical fonns will be interpreted with respect to a ·structure (D,E.T.<,timc-of), 
where D is the domain of individuals, among which E is the subset of events, T is the set 
of time intervals with ordering relation <. The function time-of takes an event and 
returns its run-time (this is Krifka's (1989) '[ function). 
Let me give a concrete derivation . Assuming that semantic combination is simple 
functional application we can, using the lexicon given below, derive logicaJ analyses of 
(ISa) and (ISb). Note that the first order variable t ranges over times, the variable e over 
events and the others over normal individuals. 
kiss 
like 
l. Y l. x l. e [kiss(e,x,y)l 
l. y l. x l. I [like(~x,Y)l 
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l. t 3e [p(e) & t=> time-of(e)] 
The analyses, then, are as follows: 
(16) a. Sandy kissed Kim. 
b. [". Sandy, [T PAST ["'" PERFECTIVE [v, t, kiss Kim]]]] 
c. 3 t3 e [kiss(e,Sandy,Kim) & t:J time-of(e) & t < now] 
(17) •. Sandy liked Kim. 
b.[". Sandy, [T PAST [v, t,likeKim]]] 
c.3 t [like(~Sandy,Kim) & t < now] 
We have, of course, simplified many of the less relevant issues, such as the treatment of 
tense. Nevertheless we get what we want: the claim on the one hand that there is a past 
time at which a kissing of Kim by Sandy occurred, and on the other the claim that there 
was a past time at which Kim liked Sandy. 
There are a number of features of the tense-aspect system of En gUsh that fall out 
of the classical Davidsonian approach. Many of these have been discussed in Katz 
(l997). Let me note an additional one here. In addition to PERFECTIVE operator, which 
in English is assumed to be covert, there is also PROGRESSIVE operator, a simple 
semantics for which is given below:' 
(18) PROGRESSIVE l.t3,[p(e)&t tim,-of(e)] 
Since like PERFECTIVE, PROGRESSIVE is a function from event predicates to time 
predicates, it should not be able to apply either to state verbs or recursively. which indeed 
it cannot 
(19) a. "'John is owning a car. 
b. ·John is being kissing Mary. 
Furthermore, the well-known "stativizing" effect of the progressive (Vlach 1981) also 
gets a fairly straightforward account, since formally the function PROGRESSIVE is a 
stativizing operator in that it rums predicates of evenlS into predicates of times. 
4.2 A classical Davidsonian account of adverbial modificatioD 
The real question we are interested in, of course, is how this whole mechanism accounts 
for the stative adverb gap. Let's first look at how adverbs are treated. We distinguish, as 
do the neo-Davidsonians, adverbs that apply to the propositional content-probably, 
frankly (S-adverbs, in Thomason and Stalnaker's (1973) terms)~from others . 
• This semantics should, of course, be modalizcd. See Zucchi (1999) for a recent swnming up of 
these issues. 
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Furthermore, we distinguish temporal adverbials-yesterday,jor an hour, on Sunday-from 
those adverbs that we can cal1 event adverbs-slow~, gent~ and the like. As would seem 
natural, temporal adverbs are predicates of times, event adverbs are predicates of events, 
and S-adverbs are interpreted as propositional functions. For concreteness, here are some 
examples: 
(20) a. possibly AP lOP] 
b. slowly loP A e [p(e) & slow(e)] 
c. yesterday A. P A. t [P(t) & yesterday(t)] 
The intended interpretation is that possibly takes a proposition and moda1izes it, slowly 
takes an event predicate and returns a predicate of slow events of the same kind, 
yesterday applies to a temporal predicate to return a predicate of times that were 
yesterday. 
The mechanism of adverbial modification adopted here is fairly simple. In 
contrast to syntactic theories such as that of Cinque (1999), I follow Wyner (1998) in 
assuming that the relative order of adverbials follows from semantic principles. In short, 
adverbials adjoin freely to elements of the extended verbal projection, subject only to 
semantic compatibility. As we have already outlined, there are two kinds of semantic 
compatibility to be considered: that of semantic type and selectional-restriction type. The 
type-driven restrictions restrict the range of possible combinations: For example, S-
adverbials must apply to propositional meanings (and therefore adjoin quite high, say to 
the TP projection), while temporal adverbs must apply to properties of times, and so 
adjoin either to AspectP or to stative VPs, and event adverbs only apply to eventive VPs. 
Selectional restrictions then rule out particular predicate/modifier combinations. 
When everything functions as it should, as in (21), the event adverb combines with a 
compatible event predicate, and then an aspecrual operator applies, and then a temporal 
adverb applies to the resulting time predicate. 
(21) a. John left slowly yesterday. 
b . [" John, [T PAST [A>p' PERFECTIVE [v, t, left slowly] yesterday]]] 
c.3 t[t < now & yesterday(t) & 3 [ t::> time-of{e) & leave(e,John) & slow(e)]] 
It should be clear that type-theoretical considerations rule out any other order in which 
these two adverbs could apply. 
Like the restriction on stative progressives, the stative adverb gap is a direct 
consequence of the structure of the theory. As we have already noted there are two 
things to explain: why eventive adverbs don 't apply to stative verbs and why there are no 
adverbs that don't apply only to stative verbs . The explanation of the first part is 
essentially identical to that proposed by that implicit in the neo-Davidsonian literature. 
Here we say that since adverbs such as slowly are, underiyingly, properties of events, 
they cannot apply to stative VPs, whi ch are properties of times . 
9
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It is the other part that is interesting. Why are there no stative adverbs? This too 
follows from the proposal. Consider a potential adverb, state-adverb. To apply to stative 
VP it must be of the type of yesterday, that is it must apply to properties of times.} But if 
it is of this type than it must also be able to apply to an eventive AspectPs. since they are 
taken to be of the same type as stative VPs. So there can be no adverb that can apply to a 
stative VP without also being able to apply to an eventive AspectP. It is the fact that 
event sentences are taken to be semantically more complex, in that they have an extra 
projection that stative sentences lack. from which it follows that there can be no stative 
adverbs. The crucial distinction here between classical Davidsonianism and neo-
Davidsonianism is that, in a sense, all sentences have a stative component on the classical 
Davidsonian analysis, while on the neo~Davidsonian analysis this would be nonesense, 
since states and events are in privative oposition. 
4.3 Still and no longer 
It has been pointed out to me that there are two adverbs that do select for stative verbs to 
the exclusion of eventive verbs. These are still and no longer. These would seem, then, to 
be direct counterexamples, both the the claim that there is an SAG and to the theory that 
predicts it 
I do not question the facts. It is quite clear that these two adverbials select for 
state verbs (or generic interpretations of non-state verbs, which is the same thing): 
(22) a. ·John kissed Mary no longer. 
b. ·John still wrote a book. 
(23) a. John no longer owned a car. 
b. 10hn was still sick. 
It is not at all clear that these adverbs are best treated as stative adverbs, in the sense that 
the introduce predication over underlying stative eventualities. They would, after all, be 
most naturally treated as temporal adverbials. If they are temporal adverbials, it not 
particularly surprising that they appear with state verbs. The question, then, would be 
why they don't seem to combine with event predicates, or, to be more precise, eventive 
AspPs. 1 think: there is very good reason for this, however. 
To set the stage, we should first note that selectional restrictions of the standard 
kind are still expected to apply at the level of tempornl adverbials. That is we expect 
there to be certain kinds of predicates of times that are simply incompatible with certain 
temporal adverbials. In fact,. this is a well known phenomenon: The classic cases of in an 
hour and/or an hour illustrate just this. 
(24) a. Peter ran the race in an hour. 
b. ·Peter owned a vacation house in the Alps in an hour. 
, II is possible that we need 10 clliend this 10 a wider da$s of spatio-tcmporal indicCli. 
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(25) a. ??Peter ran the race for an hour. 
b. Peter owned a vacation house in the Alps for an hour. 
Although both adverbials are predicates of times, because of the lexical semantics of 
temporal in and temporal/or, the former is compatible with certain types of event verbs 
and incompatible with state verbs, while the latter is compatible with state verbs. The 
literature on this topic is extensive and varied (Dowty 1979, Hinrichs 1985, Krifka 1989, 
Moltmann 1991). There is general agreement, however, that the contrast is due to purely 
temporal properties of the modifiers. This is, then, normal selectionaJ restriction at work, 
albeit in the domain of temporal predicates. 
As we have already discussed one of the features of seJectionaJ restrictions is that 
there are full paradigms. Since we find temporal modifiers (in an hour) that are 
compatible with the temporaJ properties of eventive verbs and not stative verbs, it is not 
surprising that we would find tempora] modifiers (still and no longer) that are compatible 
with the temporal properties of stative verbs but not with those of eventive verbs. 
In fact, when we consider what the semantics of still should look like, it is no longer 
surprising that it should select for state verbs. Intuitively still P means that P is true at 
some time, that it was true at some time previous to that, and that it has been true at all 
the times in between. This is formaJized in (26). 
(26) still; A P [P(I) & 3 r [I' < I & P(I') & 'I tOO [I' < I" < t -> P(I")Jll 
This analysis makes it quite clear why still ejects for state verbs, it requires that the 
temporal predicates it applies to have the subinterval property. It is well known that this 
is one of temporal properties that state verbs have but that event verbs lack. 
These are, so to speak. counterexamples that indeed prove the rule. The fact that at the 
level of temporal modification we have nonnal semantic selection, and that this has 
properties associated with other cases of semantic selection, make it that much clearer 
that the absence of "stative adverbs" is not a matter of semantic selection, but rather a 
reflection of the structure of the interpretive component 
5. Conclusions 
In summary, then, I have claimed that there is a missing class of adverbs, adverbs that 
select only for stative verbs. r have argued that such a lexical gap is not best treated as 
accidental, but rather should arrise from the structure of our theory of grammar. To that 
end I have adopted the independently motivated proposal that state verbs are to be 
distinguished from event verbs in that they do not have an extra "Davidsonian" 
eventuality argument position. This semantic proposal was then embedded in a syntactic 
framework in which the distinction between event predication, temporaJ predication and 
modal predication were introduced at distinct syntactic projections. Stative sentences, 
then, do not have either the appropriate syntax or the appropriate type-theoretical 
semantics to support a class of adverbs that does not also appear with event verbs. The 
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fact that there are certain temporal adverbials that appear only in state sentences was then 
attributed to selectional restrictions of the more familiar kind. There are ~rtain other 
issues to be addressed, such as the treatment of non·modal . non-temporal modifiers of 
state verbs. 
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